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  Just as the U.S. capital market, the intention for the regulators in China to 
encourage the listed companies to voluntarily disclose the internal control evaluation 
report and the audit report for that is to improve the corporate governance quality of 
the listed companies and hence to protect the interests of the investors. While the 
content of the disclosure in the U.S. market are mainly deficiencies of the internal 
control system after the enactment of the SOX act, just few companies in China will 
honestly describe the deficiencies of the internal control system. That is the reason 
why many researchers concluded that the internal control disclosure situation could 
hardly satisfy the regulators‘ intention, and thereby they advanced many suggestions 
to improve the disclosure quality. 
  Although the disclosure content seems to be useless, considering that the voluntary 
disclosure is always companied with certain economic motivations, we still can 
analyze the utility and value of the internal control disclosure from a different angle. 
Specifically speaking, this paper tires to research three related aspects: 1、Whether or 
not the internal control disclosure in China can be sort of value signal? 2、If it can, is 
there any difference between the signals in different entities? 3、If the answers for the 
former two questions are proved to be yes, can the signal and the difference be 
testified in reality and be accepted and distinguished by the investors? 
  The conclusions of this paper proved the questions discussed above. Generally 
speaking, the companies voluntarily disclosing the information also have better 
governance and performance. Because of the low disclosure cost and the unique 
characters of the Non-SOE, internal control evaluation can hardly be a signal for 
higher value. Testing from a practical angle, this paper found that the disclosing 
companies do have smaller probability of violating the law. However the negative 
relationship does not exist in the Non-SOE evaluation sample. Finally, this paper 
further tested whether or not the investors can accept the internal control disclosure as 
a signal and distinguish the differences above in different entities. This paper does 















for the Non-SOE evaluation samples. 
  The research conclusions above mean that the seemingly useless internal control 
disclosure reports in China also have the value of being a signal.  
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在 2012 年正式全范围展开1。其次，我国内部控制信息的披露也经历了大约 10
年的自愿性阶段。如前所述，我国上市公司的自愿披露大约开始于本世纪初期，
                                                             
1
 实际上，按照 2012 年发布的《关于 2012 年主板上市公司分类分批实施企业内部控制规范体系的通知》

















































































































































交易费用  委托代理  价值信号 市场有效  信息不对称 
内控信息披露管制历史回顾 
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